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ABSTRACT 
 
In the cases which make up the Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al. (CFE) v. The State of New 
York et al.  the court system found that the state of New York was not fulfilling its obligation to 
provide all students with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. The state was 
ordered to increase funding to New York City schools by $1.93 billion. It is crucial to evaluate 
the effectiveness of education finance reform, especially court-order reform, as a tool for policy. 
This paper examines the effects of New York City primary school spending on student’s 
educational achievement as measured by schools’ pass rate on the 4th grade state-mandated 
English Language Arts and math exams in 1999, 2006 and 2014 while controlling for student 
demographics, school size, and teacher education and experience. It is found that increased total 
per pupil expenditure has effectively zero, if not somewhat negative, effect on student exam 
pass rates suggesting inefficiencies in school level funding. This opens doors for further 
research especially using disaggregated spending data.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Determining the effects of school inputs on student performance is an important policy 
issue. This is especially true in the United States which is projected to spend an estimated 
$623.5 billion on public elementary and secondary education in the 2017-2018 school year—
over 3.1 percent of GDP (National Center for Education Statistics 2017). Despite this large 
government investment, the marginal effect of additional educational spending on student 
achievement remains contested. Differences in school’s financial resources by neighborhood is 
often cited as a primary explanation for observable achievement gaps by racial/ethnicity group 
and socioeconomic status.   
School finance reform is one of the primary tools used by policy makers to improve 
educational equity. These reforms are often the result of state court rulings which find the given 
educational funding structures unconstitutional. Such a finding was reached in both 2003 and 
2006 in the cases which make up the Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al. (CFE) v. The State of 
New York et al. In this case the court system found that the state of New York was not fulfilling 
its obligation to provide all students with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. 
After years of court struggles, the court ultimately directed the state to funnel an additional 
$1.93 billion to New York City to sufficiently meet the needs of all students.  
It is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of education finance reform, especially court-
order reform, as a tool for policy. Court-order reform is distinctive from other legislative action 
as the court system does not have the power to pass laws or set state budgets. The courts can 
find the state funding structure unconstitutional and order the state to change its ways, but it 
does not have the power to directly address the issue. So, court-ordered reform is a two-step 
system: first the court ruling, second the corrective legislative action. This can make the process 
slow and inefficient, as was the case in New York State. Due to the Great Recession of 2007-08, 
the state was unable to fulfill its obligation in a timely manner and the full additional state aid 
did not reach New York City schools until 2014. 
In this paper, I examine the effects of New York City primary school spending on 
student’s educational achievement as measured by schools’ pass rate on the 4th grade state 
mandated English Language Arts (ELA) and math exams. I study the relationship between per 
pupil total spending and school exam pass rate in the years 1999, 2006 and 2014 while 
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controlling for student demographics, school size, and teacher education and experience. In 
addition to the regression models, I also estimate counterfactuals to answer the question: what 
would the exam pass rates be in 2014 with the funding structures of 1999 or 2006? These 
counterfactuals allow me to gauge the full effect of increased spending on student achievement 
while keeping all other factors constant. 
Given the debate surrounding the effect of school spending on student outcomes, (see 
Hanusheck 1997) and the continued prevalence of court-ordered school finance reforms, (see 
Wood and Lange 2006), this paper provides important evidence that increases in total per pupil 
educational expenditure do not necessarily improve performance on state mandated exams.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section I 
describe the background of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York and the 
subsequent state funding changes. Next, I summarize previous literature on the inequality of 
school funding, the relationship between school funding and student achievement, and the 
relation between high stakes testing and life outcomes. The fourth section presents my 
methodology. In the fifth section I share the results, first examining various marginal effects on 
school exam pass rates, then the counterfactual results. The sixth and final section concludes the 
paper with suggestions for further research.  
 
1.1 Background of School Finance Reform in New York  
In May of 1993 the Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al. (CFE) v. The State of New York et 
al. was filed claiming that the state’s public school financing system was unconstitutional and 
fails to provide public school students in New York City “an opportunity to obtain a sound basic 
education” (CFE 1995). The Court defines a sound basic education as one consisting of  
basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable 
children to eventually function productively as civic participants 
capable of voting and serving on a jury. If the physical facilities and 
pedagogical services and resources made available under the present 
system are adequate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain 
these essential skills, the State will have satisfied its constitutional 
obligation. (CFE 1995). 
 
Additionally, children have the right to  
minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide 
enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children 
should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning 
such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. 
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Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of 
reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, 
mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel 
adequately trained to teach those subject areas.  (CFE 1995). 
 
Beyond these basic definitions, the Court of Appeals refused to definitively state what 
the components of a sound basic education are arguing that Regents and Commissioner 
standards went above and beyond minimally adequate. The court argued instead that what was 
relevant was whether the plaintiffs could establish a causal link between “the present funding 
system and any proven failure to provide a sound basic education to New York City school 
children” (CFE 1995).   
The State contested these claims arguing that (at the time) New York spent more per 
student than all but three other states and therefore, New York City was receiving adequate 
funding (Belfeild and Levin 2002, 186). If New York City students were not receiving sufficient 
funds it was the fault of the New York City Board of Education for not adequately managing its 
funding and failing to supplement state funding enough.  
In 2001, the State Supreme Court ruled in favor of CFE and charged the state with 
dramatically increasing funding to New York City public schools (Belfeild and Levin 2002, 
186). In order to ensure a sound basic education, Justice DeGrasse ordered the state to provide, 
at minimum, the following seven resources:  
sufficient numbers of qualified teachers, principals, and other 
personnel; appropriate class sizes; adequate and accessible school 
buildings with sufficient space to ensure appropriate class size and 
implementation of a sound curriculum; sufficient and up-to-date 
books, supplies, libraries, educational technology, and laboratories; 
suitable curricula, including an expanded platform of programs to help 
at-risk students by giving them more time on task; adequate resources 
for students with extraordinary needs; and a safe, orderly environment. 
(Huerta 2006, 381).  
  
Following a reversal by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
Supreme Court’s order in June 2003. The court looked at evidence of education inputs—
teaching, facilities and instruments of learning—and their resulting outputs – test results and 
graduation and dropout rates—to determine whether New York City schools deliver the 
opportunity for a sound basic education (CFE 2003). They found that based on teacher 
certification, test performance and experience, the quality of teachers in New York City is 
deficient. They also found that the large class sizes negatively affect student performance. The 
court also found that New York City schools are deficient in instruments of learning such as 
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classroom supplies, textbooks, libraries and computers (CFE 2003). The court noted that 
although some schools in the city may be excellent, “tens of thousands of students are placed in 
overcrowded classrooms, taught by unqualified teachers, and provided with inadequate facilities 
and equipment” and that this is large enough “to represent a systemic failure” (CFE 2003).  
Looking at the outputs of education—school completion and test results—proved 
equally grim. At the time, only 50 percent of New York City high school students graduated in 
four years and 30 percent did not graduate or receive a GED at all (CFE 2003). This was 
especially prevalent for minority and poor students. Between 1994 and 1998, 30 percent of New 
York City sixth graders scored below the state reference point in reading. Statewide, 90 percent 
scored above (CFE 2003). The court reasoned that the “causal link” between present funding 
and poor performance of City schools could be established and that improved inputs would 
yield better results.  
The court ruled that the state had until July 2004 to “ascertain the actual cost of 
providing a sound basic education in New York City” (CFE 2003). As a response, the CFE 
commissioned the New York Adequacy Study conducted by the American Institute for 
Research and Management Analysis and Planning (AIR/MAP) to outline the process of costing 
out a sound basic education in New York determining the level of resources needed for all 
students to meet the Regents Learning Standards. The Study recommended smaller class sizes 
coupled with professional teacher development and additional pupil support personnel and 
found an additional $6.2 - $8.4 billion would be needed (Huerta 2006, 383). Many other 
costing-out reports were also commissioned. The New York State Commission on Education 
Reform (the Zarbb Commission), for example, estimated that New York City needed $1.9 
billion, defining an adequate education defined as one in which 80 percent of students met the 
Regents Learning Standards by passing the 4th grade English and math exams and five high 
school Regents Exams (Hanushek 2005, 71). The City of New York proposed $5.4 billion in 
additional funding would be adequate while The New York State Board of Regents calculated 
$3.8 billion and Standard & Poor’s independent study estimates ranged from $7.3 billion to $1.9 
billion (Hanushek 2005, 69).  
In 2006, the Court of Appeals ruled that “the constitutionally required funding for the 
New York City School District includes … additional operating funds in the amount of $1.93 
billion” in 2004 dollars (CFE 2006). This amount is the minimum required to safeguard rights 
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provided by the New York State Constitution, but the court made clear that it is a matter of 
policymaking if funding is to exceed this number.  
Prior to the CFE court decision, New York State schools were funded through numerous 
state grants aimed at wealth equalization. Low wealth districts received five to six times more 
aid per student than high wealth districts. However, due to such a large discrepancy in property 
taxes between high and low wealth districts, per pupil spending in low wealth districts was 
about two-thirds the spending per pupil in high wealth districts (NYSED Primer 2005, 18). 
While the CFE case paints a grim picture regarding New York State funding, there were 
significant increases in education spending every year from 1993-94 to 2006-07 except for 
2003-04 (NYSED Primer 2005, 11).  
In 2006-07, the year before the CFE court mandate, public education spending came 
from three sources: around six percent from federal sources, 44 percent from state aid and 
grants, and 50 percent from local revenue (NYSED Primer 2007, 2). Local property taxes made 
up nearly 90 percent of local education revenue. State revenue came from three sources: The 
School Tax Relief Program (STAR) accounting for 20 percent of state revenue, the state general 
fund (68 percent of revenue), and a special revenue fund (12 percent) supported by lottery 
receipts (NYSED Primer 2007, 2). Under the STAR program, the state provides revenue to 
school districts so certain homeowners are partially exempt from district property taxes. The 
STAR program was implemented in 1998-99 and following its inception, state revenue as a 
percent of total education revenue increased by three percentage points.  
In 2007, as a response to the 2006 CFE court decision, the New York State legislature 
and executive passed a comprehensive educational finance reform changing how state aid was 
calculated, shifting many of its preexisting categorical aid programs into foundation aid and 
introducing more realistic weights for poor children (Yinger 2013, 3). It also created a new 
accountability mechanism called the Contract for Excellence to regulate how the new funding 
could be spent.  
The new foundation aid formula has three components: a target spending level, an 
expected local contribution, and a state aid amount (Yinger 2003, 2). The target spending level 
is that which the state believes will allow students to receive an adequate education. The 
expected local contribution varies with a district’s wealth so wealthier districts are expected to 
contribute more. Thus, state aid is the difference between the target level and the expected local 
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contribution. The CFE case also stressed the principle that an education finance system must 
account for the higher costs of educating at risk students (Yinger 2003, 3). Although this applied 
only to New York City schools, the state adopted this idea in its new foundation aid formulas, 
applying weights to certain at-risk groups. So, the target spending level is adjusted to reflect 
pupil need as well as regional costs (NYSED Primer 2007, 21).  
The state aid formula adopted is as follows. District Aid per Pupil = [Foundation 
Amount X Pupil Need Index X Regional Cost Index] – Expected Minimum Contribution. The 
Foundation Amount is the cost of providing an adequate education determined by the 
instructional costs of those districts who are performing well. The Pupil Need Index adds the 
costs of providing extra support to students with extraordinary needs. It is 1 + the Extraordinary 
Needs percent which is 0.65 X the 3-year average free and reduced-price lunch percent + 0.65 X 
the census percent of persons aged 5-17 in poverty + 0.5 X number of English Language 
Learners + a scarcity count which is factor for districts with fewer than 25 students per square 
mile (NYSED Primer 2007, 21). The Regional Cost Index considers purchasing power across 
the state based on the wage of non-school professionals. The Expected Minimum Local 
Contribution is the amount districts are expected to spend.  
In 2007-08, the first year with the newly implemented state funding formula, New York 
State schools funding was distributed nearly identically to the year before. Federal funds made 
up five percent of revenue, state funds were 45 percent, and local funds were 50 percent 
(NYSED Primer 2008, 2). Between districts, state funding was changed dramatically, however. 
State funding increased an average of 8.2 percent to all districts, though this was widely varied. 
Some districts saw state funding gains of over 80 percent (Millbrook School District received 
the largest increase of 84.1 percent more from the state in 2007 than in 2006) while others saw 
decreases of over 20 percent (Salamanca received 22.4 percent less from the state). New York 
City received 11.9 percent more state funding between 2006 and 2007.  
The reform was meant to provide an additional $5.5 billion in state aid phased in over 
four years (Atchison 2017, 8). During the first two years following the enactment of the new 
foundation aid formula, state aid increased $2.1 billion, however during the 2009-10 and 2010-
11 school years, due to the Great Recession, the state legislature froze increases in state aid, 
even reducing aid to New York City schools from 2009 to 2012 (New York State Education 
Department Fiscal Profiles).  
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The Great Recession greatly impacted the state’s plan to phase in additional education 
aid. Starting in 2010, New York reduced school aid by $1.4 billion, growing to a $2.6 billion 
reduction in 2011-12 (DiNappoli 2016, 5). These reductions are known as the Gap Elimination 
Adjustment (GEA) and allowed New York State to close its multi-billion-dollar deficit. 
Although reductions were need-based (reductions were lower for high-need districts than for 
low-need), because such a large percentage of funding for low need districts comes from the 
state, the average per pupil effect in high need urban/ suburban districts was -$1,206 while only 
-$633 in low-need districts (DiNappoli 2016, 5). Over time, the GEA’s effects have been 
reduced more quickly on high need districts than on low need so by 2015-16, the average GEA 
for high need districts was -$32 while the GEA was -$224 for low need districts (DiNappoli 
2016, 5). In the 2016-17 budget, the GEA was permanently eliminated.  
So where does that leave New York City? Due to the misstep in funding because of the 
Great Recession and GEA, it took New York City until 2014 to receive its minimum state 
funding increase of $1.93 billion.  
While there is ample reporting on state level funding to districts, district allocation to 
individual schools is paid relatively little attention. Prior to New York City’s adoption of the 
Fair Student Funding program in 2007, schools did not receive a lump sum of funds from the 
district, but rather received teacher position allocations based on enrollment and class size 
requirements. This creates several issues. First, schools with lower-paid teachers do not have 
additional funds nor do schools with high-paid teachers face budget constraints as the positions 
are allocated, not the revenue (Schwartz et al. 2009, 7). Thus, this method promotes the more 
senior teachers to be in the lowest need schools.  
Prior to 2007, New York City funded their schools through a basic instructional services 
formula which had three components: school overhead allocation, base teacher allocation and 
basic instructional services per capita allocation. School overhead provided a minimum for 
overhead needs such as principals, secretaries, etc. The base teacher allocation funds the number 
of teacher positions needed given by dividing the projected registered students for each grade by 
the class size for each grade. The basic instructional services per capita provides materials and 
supplies not covered by the other components.  
Following the CFE case, funding in New York City changed dramatically. Now, schools 
are funded through four main categorial allocations: fair student funding, categorical funds, 
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programmatic allocations and children first network support. Fair Student Funding covers basic 
instructional needs based on need-level of students at individual schools. Categorical allocations 
include state and federal programs as well as Contracts for Excellence Funds. These are funds 
from the state “as a result of its commitment to increase funding to New York City” and must be 
allocated according the City’s contract of excellence with the state (New York City Department 
of Education 2012, 5). Programmatic allocations fund unique programs outside the scope of fair 
student funding. Finally, children first network support funds provide flexible revenue to school 
principals to meet needs such as textbooks, supplies and equipment.  
Fair Student Funding transforms the traditional positions allocation approach to a 
transparent funding formula similar to that used for state foundation aid. It takes a fixed sum of 
$225,000 per school and weights students based on grade level, poverty, English Language 
proficiency, special education needs and type of school. A fixed amount is then added to a 
school’s funding based on the total weights (NYCDOE 2012, 11). This policy is aimed at 
providing the fairest level of funding for all children.  
Contract for Excellent funds come directly from the state and began in 2007-08 
following the CFE case. Contract for Excellent dollars must be spent in the following program 
areas: class size reduction, time on task, teacher and principal quality initiatives, middle school 
and high school restructuring, full day pre-kindergarten, and modeling programs for English 
Language Learners (NYCDOE 2012, 52). Additionally, the funds must be used predominately 
for those students with the greatest need (English Language Learners, students with disabilities, 
poor students and low-academic achievers). The Contract for Excellence funds are supplemental 
and may not be used to cover the cost of programs previously funded with local tax dollars. This 
is the state’s way of directing the CFE funds to programs it believes will provide adequate 
opportunity for all students.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW:  
 
 The relationship between school funding and student achievement is hardly a new area 
of study. Since 1966 and the publication of the Coleman Report, researchers have tried to 
answer how more money affects schools. This analysis focuses on a specific case, The 
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Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York, to see if the main goal of the case—
funding New York City schools at an appropriate level to ensure all students can attend 
“successful schools”—was met. To answer this question, I begin with a review of previous 
literature first looking at historical inequalities in school funding across the United States and in 
New York. These inequalities are what lead many states to court ordered school finance reform. 
In New York this took form as the CFE case. Second, I review literature on the relation between 
school funding and student achievement to see if the research shows that increased funding will 
necessarily result in more successful schools. Finally, the literature review examines test scores 
and life achievement. The CFE case defined successful schools as those in which 80 percent of 
students passed state standardized tests. This literature investigates whether this is an 
appropriate metric of success and what increased test scores translate to later in life.  
 My analysis of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity is an important addition to this previous 
literature. Past studies have looked at the effects of the case on district equality across New 
York State (see Atchison 2017), but none, to my knowledge, have examined the effects at the 
school level for an individual district. This paper fills that gap by studying New York City 
individually.  
 
2.1 Inequality of School Funding  
New York State is hardly the only state using the court system to fight education funding 
battles. Over the past 50 years, parties have increasingly turned to the courts to address 
perceived education opportunity inequalities in state education finance distribution formulas 
(Wood and Lange 2006, 1). In fact, all but 19 states1 had State Supreme Court rulings on the 
constitutionality of the state’s school finance system between 1967 to 2010 (Jackson et al. 2016, 
Appendix D). In response to large within-state per pupil spending differences between wealthy 
and poor districts, state supreme courts overturned state finance systems in 26 states from 1971 
to 2010. 
Scholars separate these constitutional challengers into two periods: the early challenges 
based on equity and the later challenges based on adequacy (Jackson et al. 2016, Lafortune et al. 
                                                          
1 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia all had State Supreme Court 
rulings on their school finance systems.  
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2016, Lukemeyer 2004). Equity reforms of the 1970s and 1980s aimed to reduce resource 
disparity across districts. These cases claimed that the school funding systems violated the equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution and within each state’s 
constitution.  
Reforms since the 1990s have been adequacy reforms aimed to achieve sufficient 
funding in low income districts, regardless of their implications for equity. This second wave of 
finance reform is commonly dated to the 1989 Kentucky, Montana and Texas Supreme Court 
rulings which held that these states violated their states’ education clauses. To win such cases, 
the plaintiffs must successfully meet two burdens. First, they must prove to the court that the 
education clause in that state requires the state to meet a “judicially definable and enforceable 
obligation” such as equal access to education (Lukemeyer 2004, 61). Second, the plaintiff must 
prove that the state is not meeting this obligation.   
One of the leading cases to achieve both these victories is the Kentucky Supreme Court 
case Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc which found that the state constitution requires 
“every child must be provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education” and 
that Kentucky’s school system was unequal, underfunded and inadequate (Rose n.d.). The 
Kentucky legislature responded by revamping the state’s educational finance, governance and 
curriculum with the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 (Lafortune et al. 2016, 8). 
However, since the 1990s, courts have tended to be vague in defining the states’ 
educational obligations as well as what constitutes an adequate education. This lack of clarity 
makes it difficult to craft a suitable school finance system.  The general approach to equity 
reform cases was to focus on a district’s property tax base or even decrease funding in certain 
districts to create equal funding (Lafortune et al. 2016, 11). However, with the second wave 
adequacy cases, such action would not satisfy the mandate. So, once school finance was found 
constitutionally inadequate, most states increased funding to all districts to weaken the 
relationship between the level of education spending and wealth or income level of the district 
(Jackson et al. 2016, 162). This approach, however, ignores an important aspect of school 
funding inequality: intra-district inequality.  
There are two types of disparities that result in educational inequalities: inter-district 
disparities in school revenues and intra-district disparities. In 2006-07, New York State ranked 
in the bottom ten for progressive inter-district school funding. That is, there existed “a strong, 
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negative and systematic relationship between school district poverty and state and local 
revenues per pupil” (Baker and Welner 2010, 20). This means, prior to the CFE court ruling, 
poor districts were systematically expected to receive less funding than low-poverty districts. 
Following the CFE case, New York State dramatically changed its school funding formula to 
more equitably distribute resources to all students. Research has shown that this change did not 
result in improved levels of horizontal or vertical education funding. Horizontal equity refers to 
the disparity between districts while vertical equity refers to the distribution of funds within a 
district aimed at reducing poverty (Atchison 2017, 12). Districts with a large proportion of poor 
students continue to receive less revenue than districts with wealthier students while spending 
disparities between districts have not been significantly reduced. Atchison (2017) shows that the 
lack of improvement is not due to a poorly designed finance reform, but instead due to the 
failure to fund and implement the plan as designed. If the additional funds had been phased in 
according to plan, both vertical and horizontal equity would have drastically improved.  
Despite concerns about funding inequalities between schools and districts, the literature 
on large-scale analysis of intra-district inequality in the United States is limited by data 
constraints. Ejdemry and Shores (2017) recently attempted to fill this hole in the literature. 
Using school-level finance data for nearly every U.S. school district between 2012 and 2014, 
they calculated measures of vertical inequality. They find that on average, poor and minority 
students receive 1 to 2 percent more resources than non-poor and white students in the same 
district. However, there is a large share of districts which under-allocate resources to 
disadvantaged students and variation among districts is non-trivial. In the districts with the most 
intra-district inequality, the poor receive between $300 and $500 less per pupil than the non-
poor. Additionally, while inter and intra-level inequality are nearly identical between poor and 
non-poor students, intra-district inequality exceeds inter-district inequality for black and 
Hispanic students relative to white students. This means that while funds are allocated more 
equally at the state level by race, at the district level black and Hispanic students are getting less.  
Similarly, there is “considerable evidence that resources vary across schools within 
larger districts” such as New York City and there is concern that these within district disparities 
are often perverse (Schwartz et al. 2009, 2). For example, schools with fewer low-income, high-
need students often get the most experienced teachers and staff. Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 
(2002) use data on New York State teachers to determine variations in average attributes and 
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find that urban areas generally have fewer qualified teachers than non-urban areas. Additionally, 
within urban districts, poor, low-performing and minority students are more likely to have 
uncertified teachers or teachers who failed certification exams.   
This is of importance in this analysis since the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case focused 
on how additional resources would be distributed across districts within the state, but it ignored 
how the funds would be allocated within the districts. Ignoring such a discussion may have 
limited the success of the decision to improve the adequacy of student opportunity. Furthermore, 
focusing on average expenditure or revenue of a district (the information the state collects) 
suggests that resources reach schools within that district evenly which is not always the case. 
 
2.2 School Funding and Student Achievement 
Following the publishing of the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966)—which found 
variations in per pupil spending are unrelated to variations in student achievement on 
standardized tests—many researchers have questioned if increased school spending improves 
student outcomes. The consensus among scholars is that dollars have the potential to make a 
difference in educational opportunities, but the translation from potential to actual student 
achievement is not clearly or closely observed (Jefferson 2005, 122). This translation from 
potential to actual outcomes all depends on how the available funds are used.  
This idea is demonstrated by Hanushek (1997) in a meta-analysis of some 400 studies of 
student achievement. He demonstrates that there is no systematic relationship between measured 
attributes of teachers or schools and student performance. Of 163 studies which use total 
expenditure per pupil, only 27 percent found positive, statistically significant marginal effects 
on student performance. When only single state samples are used, there are even a smaller 
percentage of studies which shows positive, significant results. Table 1 below summarizes his 
findings.  
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Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Estimated Effect of Expenditure Per Pupil  
    Statistically Significant  Statistically Insignificant 
Expenditure 
Per Pupil 
Number of 
Estimates 
Positive Negative   Positive Negative 
Unknown 
Sign 
Total 163 27% 7%  34% 19% 13% 
 
Single State 
Samples 
89 20% 11%   30% 26% 12% 
 
Multiple State 
Samples 
74 35% 1%  39% 11% 14% 
Source: Hanushek, Eric A. 1997. “Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student Performance: An 
Update.” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 19, no. 1:141-164.  
 
Hanushek argues these results are not because money does not matter, but rather because 
there is no guarantee that a school with more funds will use that money effectively. This is 
consistent with others who show that how the money is spent is more important than how much 
funding a school receives (Boser 2011; Greene et al. 2007; Wenglinsky 1997). In fact, in a 
nationally representative study of more than 9,000 school districts, Boser (2011) showed that 
after controlling for factors outside a district’s control such as cost of living and student poverty, 
41 states have the potential for double digit percentage increase in student achievement on 
standardized tests without spending any more money. This is because more than one million of 
the total 54 million K-12 students in the United States attend highly inefficient schools. 
Furthermore, in only 16 states does increased spending correspond to increased student 
achievement (Boser 2011, 227).  
Of the schools that are successful in translating additional spending into increased 
student achievement, the common thread is the creation of an educational environment which 
supports and respects teachers. Schools where students have the greatest college aspirations are 
those with the highest percentage of faculty with advanced degrees (Greene et. al 2007, 64). It 
has been shown a positive school environment – one in which teachers, principals and students 
have good relationships, high morale and positive attitudes about their school—is among the 
only proven factor to contribute to higher student achievement (Wenglinsky 1997, 221). Schools 
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can achieve this environment of respect through professional development, employee 
compensation, and reduced class sizes (Greene et al. 2007 and Wenglinsky 1997). 
Evidence from New York City schools suggests similar trends to those seen at state and 
district levels: there is a little evidence between aggregated measures of spending and student 
achievement, however, when the data is disaggregated, there is some connection especially 
between teachers and students’ outcomes. New York City schools also experience increased 
successes when teachers are more respected and developed. Using school- level, per pupil 
expenditure data, Chellman and Weinstein (2005) find that successful schools in New York City 
spend significantly more on human resources than on any other resource such as textbooks, 
supplies, computers or equipment. When the aggregate spending line “teacher spending” is 
examined, there are no significant differences between successful and unsuccessful schools. 
However, when that line is disaggregated into categories such as all teacher salary and benefits, 
full-time teachers, part-time teachers, and other teacher salary and benefits, there are many 
statistically significant differences, though the authors do not indicate which ones. Overall, the 
data shows that schools that emphasize human resources have better teacher and administrative 
attitudes with lower turnover which leads to better student outcomes and a reduction in test 
score gaps (Chellman and Weinstein 2005, 23).  
Rockoff (2008) finds similar results in analyzing a teacher mentoring program in New 
York City. He finds that student high achievement in math and reading is higher among those 
with teachers who receive more hours of mentoring. This supports the theory that teachers who 
feel more supported and respected produce better school environments and therefore better 
student results.  
Interestingly, this support is not necessarily tied to compensation. This can be seen in the 
results of a teacher incentive program implements in 200 New York City public schools from 
2007-08 to 2009-10. Under this scheme, schools would be rewarded additional funds to 
distribute to teachers as they see fit for schools who were able to improve the school 
environment, student progress and student performance. The scheme did not increase student 
achievement (Fryer 2013, 400). Fryer contributes the lack of the scheme’s success to evidence 
that shows incentives tied to inputs are more likely to influence student behavior than those 
linked to student outcomes (Fryer 2013, 404). Teachers who are offered incentives to alter 
education inputs are much more likely to change their behavior while incentivizing outcomes 
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had no significant effect on changing teacher behavior. Thus, increasing spending on teacher 
professional development may be a way to improve student outcomes.  
While there are mixed results concerning the correlation between school funding and 
student achievement, there does appear to be a systematic relationship between school spending 
and student outcomes in the form of labor market earnings. Verstegen and King (1998) review 
35 years of research relating school spending and student achievement and find a strong and 
persistent relation between school spending and increased earning over time. This is consistent 
with the work of Jackson, Johnson, and Perisco (2015) who track the effects of increased school 
spending on children through their lives. After controlling for parental education and occupation 
status, parental income, mother’s marital status at birth, birth weight, child health insurance 
coverage, gender, and race as well as other policies which may have had an effect, including 
school desegregation, hospital desegregation, state kindergarten funding, Title I funding, 
average childhood spending on food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and 
Medicad, they found a 10 percent increase in per pupil spending for all 12 years of education 
results in in improved life outcomes for students; Students completed more years of education 
and earned higher wages as adults. Poor students who experienced the spending increases while 
in school were also less likely to be poor as adults (Jackson et al. 2015, 213).  
Caution must be used when interpreting results from these studies, however. The use of 
production equations, such as those used in cost-benefit analysis of school funding and student 
achievement, are limited as they model only quantitative contributions of resources and ignore 
qualitative aspects that may have a large effect on students (Verstegen and King 1998, 261). 
Costrell et al. (2008) argue that cost function regression analysis is useful for providing 
estimates of average spending for districts given certain characteristics and indicating how 
spending varies by the characteristics. However, the authors warn, that it is a significant stretch 
to go from a regression to claiming estimates of the costs needed to achieve any given 
performance level for districts. Relationships between cost and performance are highly 
unreliable and the authors point to numerous studies which only achieved the results they did by 
tinkering with the model specification. They also point out that average spending (offered by 
regression analysis) differs greatly from minimum spending (the main policy concern). The 
usual practice in cost function analysis is to identify the cost of public school education as the 
average spending, thus defining the minimum cost of successful schooling as the average cost. 
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This leads to policies that raise expenditures on those below the average which raises the 
average again. The authors argue “this methodology is a recipe for perpetual findings of 
inadequacy under forever-recurring litigation” (Costrell, et al. 2008, 221).  
Beyond being cautious with the econometric method, some scholars argue that 
standardized test scores are not the best metric to predict and measure student achievement 
suggesting the use of high school grade point averages instead. Using University of California 
students, Geiser and Santelices (2007) found that high school grades are consistently the best 
indicator of how students are likely to perform in college both in their first year and for long-
term outcomes such as college graduation rate and cumulative college GPA. Another argument 
against using standardized tests as a measure of achievement is these tests reflect student 
performance in a single, multi-hour setting and more often measure test-taking ability and skill 
rather than English or math. In contrast, high school GPA reflects years of performance across a 
variety of subjects and reflects motivation, discipline and perseverance, skills which are much 
more important to possess in college and beyond.  
Additionally, using national panel data of over 14,000 students, Rumberger and Palardy 
(2005) found that schools with the largest growth in student achievement are not necessarily 
effective in preventing or reducing dropout and transfer rates. It is intuitive to believe that 
factors which increase student learning such as committed and competent teachers and leaders 
would also improve dropout rates, but research suggests that pressure for school accountability 
on rigorous high school exams has pressured some schools to discharge the lowest-performing 
students. The literature shows that using test scores alone to measure school or student 
performance is insufficient. Without using alternative measures, tests scores may lead to 
incorrect conclusions regarding which schools are effective and what lead those schools to be 
effective.  
Even with decades of research, little consensus has been reached regarding the 
connection between school district spending and student achievement. Most scholars argue that 
through channels which increase school efficiency and environment, better student outcomes 
can be achieved. There is a stronger consensus regarding labor market outcomes and the 
literature shows that increased school spending does result in improved labor market outcomes 
for students later in life.  
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2.3 Test Scores and Life Achievement  
High stakes, state mandated testing has been growing in popularity in the United States, 
particularly in high schools. As of 2012, 26 states required students to pass at least one exit 
exam to receive a high school diploma (Holme et al. 2010, 476). In 2000, New York State’s 
Board of Regents began the phasing in a series of college preparatory courses and exams 
required for every student to graduate high school. By June 2005, the phase in was complete and 
high school graduation required the passage of a minimum of five end of course exams (Sipple 
et al. 2004, 143). These exams are intended to meet several goals: to incentivize schools to 
educate even the lowest achieving students, to increase student effort, and to certify that 
students have mastered some set of skills. However, critics of exit exams argue that instead of 
achieving the above goals, these exams set unnecessary restrictions on graduation and 
discourage the low achieving students, those most often from disadvantaged socio-economic 
backgrounds, from persisting in schools thus increasing dropout rate and educational inequality 
(Reardon et al. 2010, 499).  
When the literature is examined, there is very little evidence to conclude that exit exams 
have either positive or negative effects on students. In a study of four large California public 
schools, 10th graders who failed the California High School Exit Exam (CHSEE) with scores 
very near the passing score (roughly 15 percent of the students who took the exam) showed no 
systematic positive or negative effects on subsequent achievement, persistence, graduation, or 
course selection after failing on their first attempt (Reardon et al. 2010, 513). This study focused 
only students whose scores were near passing and so it is not possible to generalize these results 
to students with very low skills. However, the lack of any difference in outcomes for those just 
above and just below the passing score suggests that failing the exit exam has little motivational 
discouragement.  
Likewise, Carnoy et al. (2001) review the literature on the positive and negative claims 
for the Texas accountability system and the impact of the Texas exit exams—the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). These tests are administered each year in grades 3 
through 8 and again in 10th grade when passing the exam is a requirement for graduation. The 
authors found “little relationship between changes in TAAS scores and changes in dropout rates 
across high schools” (Carnoy et al. 2001, 3). The authors find schools with larger increases in 
student pass rate on the tenth grade TAAS do have larger declines in dropout rates. However, 
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there is a much weaker relationship between increases in the 10th grade TAAS pass rate and the 
proportion of 10th graders who reach 12th grade two years later. There is also no significant 
relationship between 10th grade TAAS scores and the school’s average SAT score (Carnoy et al. 
2001, 25).  
Given these findings, Holme et al. (2010) conduct a review of 46 unique studies of 
school exit exams focusing on four domains: student achievement, graduation, postsecondary 
outcomes, and school response. The literature points to a lack of overall achievement effects 
especially for students at the bottom of the achievement distribution. There is some evidence 
that the high-stakes nature of these tests reduces performance for racial and ethnic minorities 
and girls in some subjects due to stereotype threat (Holme et al. 2010, 491). When it comes to 
dropout and graduation rates, minimum competency exams—exams which ask students to 
perform at middle school levels— have little impact on dropout rates, yet the more rigorous 
high school exit exams are consistently associated with increased dropout rates, especially for 
low achievers and urban, high poverty schools. There is consistent evidence that exit exams 
induce dropout through student discouragement and negative psychological effects, especially 
for high poverty urban schools (Holme et al. 2010, 504). 
For elementary school students, there are also negative psychological impacts of high 
stakes testing. When comparing test anxiety on high stakes standardized tests and low stakes 
classroom testing, elementary school students reported significantly more anxiety in relation to 
the high stakes tests—68 percent reporting moderate to high test anxiety on the high stakes 
exams compared to 55 percent on low stakes exams (Segool et al. 2013, 495). Beyond reporting 
higher levels of test anxiety, elementary school students also experienced significantly increased 
cognitive and psychological symptoms of anxiety in relation to high stakes tests.  
Another of the goals of high stakes testing is to certify that students have met some set of 
measured skills. Does possession of these skills translate to labor market outcomes? The 
literature indicates that exit exams, both rigorous and not, have no consistent connection to 
employment or earnings overall. Subgroup effects by race, ethnicity and gender are inconsistent 
and in total indicate few positive effects (Holme et al. 2010, 515). Diplomas do serve as a 
positive signal in the labor market, yet it is unclear whether diplomas are attractive to employers 
because of exit exams or other factors.  
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The literature also suggests that the perceived pressure to increase test scores is 
experienced most deeply by teachers serving the most impoverished students. This translates to 
increased use of “skill and drill” instruction in poor and urban schools, where teachers spend 
more time on test preparation activities. This means decreased time spent by these students on 
long-term projects, performance-based activities, hands-on experiments and other enrichment 
activities. The same type of teaching to the test does not occur in suburban schools with higher 
socioeconomic status. Thus, poor, urban and minority students “who are often among the most 
disengaged in the school system, face repetition of minimum level, test-like information, at the 
expense of diverse and interesting learning opportunities and subject matter not covered in state 
tests (such as science and social studies at the elementary level, and fine or performing arts)” 
(Moon et al. 2007, xiii).  
Much of the literature shows that schools are increasing remediation for at-risk students, 
however, some schools adopt responses that are not necessarily in the students’ best interests. 
For example, a study in New York found that interviewed superintendents and principals shifted 
students on the verge of dropping out to GED programs so that students could be counted as 
transfers, not dropouts. This was commonly referred to as “disappearing” students (Sipple et al. 
2004, 159). Similarly, as a response to TAAS, the high-stakes Texas exams, Texas high schools 
either encouraged students to dropout before 10th grade or strategically retained and skipped 
students over the 10th grade year. Not surprisingly, schools with high retention rates and student 
“disappearances” had higher exit exam scores (Holme et al. 2010, 520). 
School exit exams were adopted to incentivize schools to educate even the lowest 
achieving students, to increase student effort, and to certify that students have mastered some set 
of skills. The literature provides little evidence of reaching any of these. It appears that instead 
of incentivizing schools to focus on the lowest achievers, these students are strategically pushed 
out of the system to avoid low test scores. Instead of increasing student effort, these tests 
demoralize students—especially those of color and in high-poverty urban schools—and lead to 
dropout. The final goal may be reached if we consider that employers value diplomas and as an 
extension may therefore value the exit exams, although this is stretch. Overall, high-stakes 
exams seem to do more harm than good. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Measuring Student Outcomes: 
For the purposes of this paper, I will be attempting to explain student achievement at the 
individual school level as measured by the percentage of 4th graders who passed the state 
English and math exams. The Zarb Commission defined successful schools as those in which 80 
percent of fourth graders passed the math and English exams and 80 percent of high schoolers 
passed at least five high school graduation tests in calculating that an estimated additional $1.9 
billion needed for New York City schools (Hanushek 2004, 71). This definition of the objective 
of an adequate education was ultimately accepted in the court’s decision as the ruling in 2006 
mandated that New York City school receive a minimum of $1.93 billion more. Thus, for my 
analysis I will be measuring the change in the amount of New York City elementary schools 
who became successful, as per the above definition, after the additional funds were received.  
There is some trepidation among scholars in using standardized test scores as a measure 
of school and teacher effectiveness. This is because these methods can fail to separate other 
influences on learning and create confusion about relative influences on student achievement 
(Baker 2010, 8). There are great limitations to using test scores to estimate causal quantities as 
there are many other factors that contribute to student achievement. These concerns are 
recognized in this analysis, however following the court’s accepted definition of adequate 
student outcomes seems to be the best course of action when determining if adequacy was 
indeed met. Additionally, other metrics such as graduation rate or student GPA, were not 
available to me at the individual elementary school level.  
 
3.2 Why Elementary Schools? 
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York and subsequent state funding 
change affected all public schools in the state. The courts defined a successful school as one 
where at least 80 percent of students passed the 4th grade math and ELA exams and/or five or 
more high school Regents exams. This analysis will focus solely on public elementary schools 
and the 4th grade math/ELA exams. There are two main reasons for this decision: (1) the Small 
Schools of Choice (SSC) program in New York City high schools and (2) the difference in the 
high stakes nature of exams.  
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The first reason why elementary schools are more desirable than high schools in this 
analysis is the conception and implementation of Small Schools of Choice which operated 
between 2002 and 2008 in New York City. During this time, small public high schools in New 
York City were created in mostly high-poverty communities to replace large, low-performing 
high schools. The schools then compete for students through the city’s system of school choice. 
These new schools have between 100 and 200 students enrolled compared to the 350 or more 
that traditional large high schools had. The SSC program also included new principals and 
teachers, start-up funding, assistance with leadership and staff development, and partnerships 
with local businesses to offer students out-of-the-classroom experiences (Social Programs 2017, 
2). To populate these schools, all rising 9th graders in the city’s public schools rank their 
preferences for which high school to attend and are placed in their most preferred school with an 
open spot.  
This study will use the years 1999, 2006 and 2014 to analyze the effectiveness of 
increased schools funding on exam pass rates in New York City schools. Because of the SSC 
movement between 2002 and 2008, only a dozen high schools that were operational in 1999 still 
existed in 2014. Isolating the impact of funding changes in the context of a complete 
organizational overhaul is next to impossible and would not yield valid results. The SSC 
program had no effect on elementary schools, however, which makes them the clear choice for 
this analysis.  
The second reason for focusing on elementary schools instead of high schools concerns 
the difference in the stakes of the respective exams. In both elementary and high schools, 
students take state standardized exams—either the 4th grade math and ELA exams or the high 
school Regents exams. These tests are considered high stakes because both are tied directly to 
student promotion, though in different ways. Since the tests’ implementation in 1999, 
elementary school students who scored at the lowest level on the 4th grade math and ELA exams 
would not be able to advance to the next grade without being reassessed and scoring at the next 
highest level (Short and Campanile 2014). In the spring of 2014, the policy was changed 
slightly. For students who scored at the lowest level on the exams, “performance portfolios” 
would be compiled (Darville 2015). If the principal determines that the student’s portfolio meets 
state standards, they do not have to reassess or attend summer school. If the portfolio is not 
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satisfactory, the student will attend summer school at the end of which his or her performance 
will be considered again.  
This change had little impact on student retention rates in its first year, however. In 
2013, the last year when test scores determined promotion, 10 percent of third through eighth 
grade students were recommended for summer school and 2.5 percent of all students in those 
grades were ultimately retained. In 2014, with the adoption of the promotion portfolio approach, 
7.4 percent of students were still recommended to summer school while 1.2 percent of all 
students were held back (Darville 2015). Additionally, this new retention criteria were passed in 
April 2014. Elementary students would have already taken the exams for that year in March and 
teachers would have prepared students in the same way they had in past. Neither teacher nor 
student behavior would be different for the 2014 exams.  
Conversely, the high stakes nature of the high school Regents exams have changed more 
dramatically between 1999 and 2014 and are arguably more high stakes than the comparable 
elementary school exams. The Regents exams began as high school end-of-course exams in 
1878. Starting in 1999, however, the Regents began to be phased in as requirements for high 
school graduation. In 1999 students needed to pass only the English exam to graduate, but by 
2005 all exams were phased in and graduation required the passing of five exams throughout 
one’s high school career (Sipple, Killen and Monk 2004, 147).  For my analysis, which begins 
in 1999, there is once again not enough data for high schools. Since the nature of the exams was 
changing from 1999 to 2005, it is not possible to know if changes in the pass rates on these 
exams was due to changes in the exams or changes in school funding. The stakes of the 4th 
grade exams remained largely unchanged for the entire period.  
Furthermore, I argue that the Regents exams are more high stakes than the elementary 
exams. While I am not negating the importance of being held back in the fourth grade, I do 
argue that not graduating high school is a much larger consequence. Likewise, high school 
graduation rates are much more widely reported, scrutinized and tied to school funding than 
fourth grade exam rates. Studies have shown that at the high schools often react to high stakes 
exams by “disappearing” students (Holme et al. 2010; Sipple et al. 2004). That is, schools will 
shift at risk students to GED programs, strategically retain and skip students over grades, and 
even encourage some students to dropout all to increase the schools’ exam scores. This behavior 
will lead to bias in the high school Regents exam pass rates. These practices are not as 
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widespread at the elementary level and again make elementary schools the clear choice for my 
study.  
 
3.3 Description of Data: 
I will be using two datasets for my analysis. Both datasets are available with annual data 
from 1999-00 to 2015-16. The first contains data on New York City School expenditures while 
the second contains data on student assessments and demographics. The school expenditure data 
comes from the New York City Department of Education and are titled School Based 
Expenditure Reports (SBER). These reports include per student expenditure by school. 
The second dataset is the school report card data (SRCD) from the New York State 
Education Department. This includes demographic information by school such as racial and 
gender makeup of the school, the percentage of English Language Learners and the percentage 
of students who receive free and reduced-price lunch. It also includes information about each 
school such as average class size, annual attendance rates, number and percent of suspensions 
and graduation rates. Staff demographics are also recorded such as percent of teachers without 
certification or with a Master’s degree.  
Finally, this dataset is important as it includes information on student assessments. For 
the 4th grade math/ ELA assessment, the number and percent of students at each school scoring 
at each level (Level 1 through 4) is recorded along with the overall mean score for that school. 
A Level 1 score indicates the student is well below proficient in the standards for their grade 
while a level 2 score shows students are partially proficient. Both level 1 and level 2 are failing 
scores. Scores of level 3 or level 4 are considered passing, with proficiency and excellence, 
respectively (State Education Department 2014).  
 
3.4 Imputation Methods: 
The 1999 School Report Card Data was unfortunately missing much demographic 
information regarding both students and teachers. To still use 1999 as a base year in my 
analysis, I imputed the demographic data for the following variables. For students: the percent 
receiving free or reduced-price lunch and racial/ethnic demographics (percent black, Hispanic, 
white, Asian, and American Indian). For teachers: experience (the percent with fewer than three 
years of experience, percent teaching outside their certification area), education (the percent 
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with no valid certification and the percent with a Masters degree or more), and the five-year 
turnover rate.  
I imputed these values using a linear extrapolation method. I had data on the above 
variables for both 2006 and 2014. I assumed that the annual rate of change seen in the variables 
of interest between 2006 and 2014 was the same as the annual rate of change between 1999 and 
2006. I found the difference in the variables between 2006 and 2014 then multiplied that 
difference by 7/8 to find the rate of change between 1999 and 2006. Once this was found I 
simply subtracted this from the observed values in 2006.  
I was able to impute the variables for 454 out of 602 schools in 1999. The other 148 
schools could not follow this method as data was missing for either 2006 or 2014. In those 
instances, I found the average imputed value by community school district and imputed that 
value. New York City has 32 community school districts which share geography and 
population. For this reason, the average of each community district would serve as an 
appropriate estimate for any missing data within that district. For example, in New York City 
Community School District #9, there were 19 elementary schools in 1999. Three of these 
school’s demographics were not able to be imputed linearly since there was missing data from 
2006 or 2014. Using the 16 schools with imputed data I found the average of each variable (60.9 
percent Hispanic, for instance) and imputed this value for the three schools with missing values. 
This method ensured that the average for each community school district remained unchanged.  
Once all values were imputed, I changed any negative values to 0 and any values above 
100 percent to 1. Since all the variables imputed were all demographic percentages, it does not 
make sense to leave these negative or exceeding 100 percent.  
To check that this was an appropriate method, I compared the imputed values’ averages 
by community school district to the recorded averages by community school district in the 
Education Demographic and Geographic Estimates (EDGE) data from the 2000 Census. This 
contains data on children enrolled in public schools by school district for the year 2000. The 
mean values of student racial and ethnic characteristics in the dataset were compared to the 
mean values from my imputation for each of the 32 community school districts in New York 
City. Referring to my previous example, the average imputed value for the percent of Hispanic 
students in NYC Community district #9 is 60.9 percent while the actual value reported in the 
edge data is 60.4 percent. The mean differences between the two are very small, all within 2 
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percentage points, apart from the percent of black students. The imputed average is 34.6% while 
the EDGE data averages 38.9%. This difference is not particularly worrisome, however, as it is 
still with 5% of the imputed value and the EDGE data is for 2000 while my imputed values are 
for 1999. I was not able to check the validity of the imputation for the percent of students on 
free or reduced-price lunch since this data is not available disaggregated by school districts.  
For the teacher data, I was only able to compare the percent of teachers with no valid 
certification and the percent of teachers with a master’s degree or more. I compared these 
imputed values to the reported percentages by the New York State Education Department 
Personnel Master File Statistics (PMF). The earliest year of available data is 2001. Just like the 
EDGE data, the Personnel Master Files provide summary data by school district. In this case, 
information such as education level and salary are collected for all public-school teachers. There 
is a mean difference between the imputed value and the reported value for the percent of 
teachers with no certification of 9.8 percentage points. The mean difference is 5.8 percent for 
percent with master’s degree or more.2 There are obvious issues in using the PMF to check the 
validity of my imputation. First, the data are not for the same year. Second, the Personnel 
Master Files are for all schools in each community district, not just elementary schools as is the 
case with the imputed values.  Even with these difficulties, the imputed values for teacher 
characteristics are still within 10 percentage points of the actual values.  
 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics: 
3.5.1 Testing Trends: 
The fourth grade English Language Arts (ELA) and math exams are scored on a level 
system. Students with a level 1 score are performing well below proficiency for the standards in 
their grade. They demonstrate limited and insufficient knowledge or skills for the expectations 
of fourth grade. Students with a level 2 score are partially proficient. Although their knowledge 
and skills are insufficient, they are still considered on track to meet New York State graduation 
requirements with some remediation. Students at a level 3 are proficient in the standards of the 
grade. Their knowledge and skill are considered sufficient for the fourth grade. Students at a 
                                                          
2 Tables summarizing my imputation results with comparisons to either EDGE or PMF data by community school 
district are available in the Appendix. 
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level 4 are excelling and have knowledge and skill that is more than sufficient for the 
expectations of the grade (State Education Department 2014, 2).  
The court in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York defined a 
successful elementary school as one in which at least 80 percent of students passed the fourth 
grade ELA and math exams. For the purposes of this analysis, I am defining “passing” the exam 
as achieving a level 3 or 4 score in 1999 and 2006 and a level 2, 3, or 4 score in 2014. These 
differing definitions are an attempt to correct for a change in the structure of the ELA and math 
exams between 2006 and 2014. In 2010, New York State decided that the state exams had 
become too easy to pass and implemented exams that were more difficult. The state made the 
test questions less predictable and raised the number of correct answers needed to pass. For 
example, in 2009 a fourth grader needed 37 out of 70 questions correct on the math exam to 
reach a level 3. The following year, a fourth grader need 51 out of 70 to reach the same level 
(Medina 2010). 
As a result, scores dropped statewide. In 2009, 86 percent of students were deemed at or 
above grade level in math and 77 percent at or above grade level in English. One year later, 61 
percent were passing in math and only 53 percent in English (Medina 2010). In 2013 the exams 
got even more difficult by aligning the exams to the Common Core. The new standards require 
students to show more advanced analytical skills through solving math problems with multiple 
steps and writing in-depth essays (Hernandez and Gebeloff 2013). In New York City, scores 
dropped dramatically. The year before the change 47 percent of city students passed the English 
exam and 60 percent passed the math exam. In 2013, with the adoption of the Common Core 
standards, 26 percent of students passed the English exam and 30 percent passed in math 
(Hernandez and Gebeloff 2013).  
Figures 1 and 2 below show the percent of 4th grade students, both across New York 
state and in New York City3, scoring at a level 3 or 4 from 1999 to 2016. From the graph, we 
can see the sharp drop in pass rates after 2009 and 2012, the two times the state made the exams 
more difficult. We can also see the state pass rate has historically been slightly above the city 
pass rate, but scores move together, and this is no different after 2009 or 2012.  
 
                                                          
3 New York City’s percent of students scoring at a level 3 or 4 was unavailable in 2000 and 2001 for math and 2001 
for English. 
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Figure 1: Percent of Students Level 3+, 4th Grade Math 
 
Figure 2: Percent of Students Level 3+, 4th Grade ELA
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due to the change in exam structure in 2010 and 2013. From this point forward, when I refer to 
“passing an exam” these are the definitions I mean.  
Performance on the exams has been rising over time. In 1999, 35.4 percent of city 
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59.8 percent in English and 72.2 percent in math. In 2014, 68.5 percent of city fourth graders 
passed the ELA exam and 69.9 percent passed the math exam.  
 
Figure 3: Fourth Grade ELA Exam Results
 
 
Figure 4: Fourth Grade Math Exam Results
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unchanged from 1999 to 2014 except for noticeable shifts in the shares of black and Hispanic 
students. 
 
Table 2: Elementary School Student Demographics 
2014 (N = 591) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 74.33% 81 4 100 
Race     
Black 27.24% 16 0 97 
Hispanic 40.71% 34 2 98 
Asian 13.80% 5 0 94 
White 16.39% 3 0 91 
Native American 0.89% 0 0 31 
English Language Learners 14.97% 12 0 69 
     
2006 (N = 586) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 78.65% 87 0 100 
Race     
Black 31.49% 22 0 97 
Hispanic 38.41% 31 2 98 
Asian 13.10% 4 0 93 
White 16.43% 3 0 91 
Native American 0.45% 0 0 4 
English Language Learners 15.88% 13 0 63 
     
1999 (N= 602) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 80.77% 88 0 100 
Race     
Black 35.13% 25.31 0 100 
Hispanic 36.02% 29.63 0 100 
Asian 13.23% 4.88 0 92.13 
White 16.68% 4.06 0 97.13 
Native American 0.48% 0 0 6.63 
English Language Learners 14.23% 11.98 0 54.93 
 
The largest change has been the percent of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch 
(FRPL). In 1999, over 80 percent of students, on average, received the service. In 2006 this 
percent had decreased to just over 78 percent and by 2014, 74 percent of elementary students 
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received free or reduced-price lunch. Despite the decrease at the mean, in every year there were 
still schools with 100 percent of its students on free and reduced-price lunch. The program 
provides either free meals or meals for 25 cents to students whose families earn below some 
income threshold. The Federal guidelines for the program state the cutoff for reduced lunch is 
185 percent of the official poverty line while those with income below 130 percent of the 
official poverty line eat school lunch for free. In addition to these guidelines, in New York State, 
students automatically quality for the program if they live in a family already receiving 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) or Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) benefits.  
For the purposes of this analysis, the percent of students receiving free or reduced-price 
lunch will serve as a proxy for the percent of students living in poverty. This is a common 
practice in education policy. This is because the measure is more available at the school level 
while poverty rate is generally not. Additionally, since the FRPL program eligibility is derived 
from the federal poverty level, it is highly related to it and is therefore useful for analysis 
(Snyder and Musu-Gillete 2015).  
Other student characteristics, such as race/ethnicity and English Language status did not 
see as great a change from 1999 to 2014. The percent of English Language Learners (ELL) 
remained around 15 percent over the period.  In New York State, ELL students are those who 
“speak a language other than English by reason of foreign birth or ancestry and either 
understand and speak little English or score below a specific threshold on a proficiency exam” 
(Education Commision 2014). The percent of White, American Indian, and Asian students all 
remain largely unchanged—around 16 percent, under one percent, and around 13 percent, 
respectively. The percentage of Hispanic students has grown from 1999 to 2014 (from 36 
percent to 40 percent) while the percent of Black students has declined (from 35 percent to 27 
percent) between 1999 and 2014. It is important to note that that there is widespread segregation 
in New York City, however, as there are schools in every year with close to 100 percent Black, 
Hispanic, Asian or white students.  
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3.5.3 Teacher Characteristics: 
While there was relatively little change in student demographics from 1999 to 2014, 
there are large changes in teacher characteristics. On average, New York City elementary school 
teachers became more educated and more experienced over the period. 
 
Table 3: Elementary Teacher Demographics 
2014 (N = 591) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Student to Teacher Ratio 14.99 14.95 4.83 78.56 
No Valid Certification 0.23% 0 0 9 
Teaching Outside Certification 4.00% 2 0 33 
Less Than 3 Years’ Experience 9.37% 8 0 48 
Masters Degree or More 48.76% 48 5 90 
5 Year Turn Over Rate 13.64% 0 0 88 
     
2006 (N = 586) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Student to Teacher Ratio 13.57 13.56 3.15 45.69 
No Valid Certification 3.50% 3 0 18 
Teaching Outside Certification 11.60% 11 0 38 
Less Than 3 Years’ Experience 14.76% 13 0 47 
Masters Degree or More 36.43% 35 0 88 
5 Year Turn Over Rate 17.76% 17 0 75 
     
1999 (N= 602) 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Student to Teacher Ratio 15.98 16.05 5.48 24.33 
No Valid Certification 6.28% 4.75 0 33.75 
Teaching Outside Certification 18.91% 16.88 0 71.25 
Less Than 3 Years’ Experience 19.87% 18.35 0 73.88 
Masters Degree or More 26.23% 23.19 0 98 
5 Year Turn Over Rate 25.31% 22.3 0 100 
 
The percent of teachers without any valid certification dropped from over 6 percent to 
less than one percent while the percent of teachers with Master’s degrees nearly doubled (from 
26 percent to 48 percent). Teachers were also more likely to teach within their certification area. 
In 1999, nearly one in five teachers taught outside their field while by 2014 that ratio reduced to 
only one in 25. Teachers were also more likely to stick around. The five-year turn-over rate was 
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cut almost in half, from 25 percent in 1999 to 14 percent in 2014. The student-teacher ratio 
remained fairly constant with averages of 16, 14, and 15 in 1999, 2006 and 2014, respectively.  
 
3.5.4 Spending Trends: 
From 1999 to 2014, the mean per pupil expenditure in New York City elementary 
schools more than doubled. In 1999, schools spent an average of just over $9,770 per student. In 
2006, the year before the CFE case, New York City schools were spending an average of 
$15,868 per student. By 2014, when all of the additional funding mandated by the CFE case was 
realized, these same schools were spending $21,393 per student.  
On average, New York City spends about $2,000 less per student every year than the 
state as whole, however, the upward trend in spending is in line with per pupil spending in the 
rest of the state. In 1999, New York State averaged per pupil spending of $11,569 while 
averaging $23,884 in 2014.  
Both New York State and New York City spend more per pupil, on average, than the 
rest of the nation. The average per pupil spending in the US in 1999 was around $8,500. This 
number increased in 2006 to around $12,000 but then leveled out. By 2014, US schools were 
only spending $721 more per pupil than 2006.  
 
Figure 5: Mean Total Expenditure Per Pupil 
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The split in expenditure between New York and the rest of the country could be 
explained by the CFE case and the resulting change in funding structure. Following the ruling, 
New York not only increased funding to New York City, but completely changed its funding 
formula and as a result total state funding increased and many disadvantaged districts received 
more state resources. Without the CFE ruling it is possible that both New York City and New 
York State mean expenditure per pupil would have followed the national trend and remained 
constant from 2006 to 2104.  
 
3.6 Model Specification: 
Many education policy studies examine the link between student achievement and 
school spending using panel data with time periods that span some policy change which led to 
an exogenous change in spending. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) argue that “standard linear 
panel data models are not well suited to pass rates as it is difficult to impose a positive yet 
bounded effect of spending on pass rates” (p. 121). Linear functional forms have several 
drawbacks in this type of analysis. First, there is the question as to whether linear models 
accurately capture the diminishing returns of spending for those schools at the top of the 
spending distribution. Second, linear functional forms for conditional means might miss 
important nonlinearities. Furthermore, the traditional solution—using the log-odds 
transformation—fails at the corners, zero and one (Papke and Wooldridge 2008, 122).  
A solution to the above difficulties is to use a fractional response model when the 
dependent variable is continuous and greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to one. 
The method is most often used for outcomes such as rates, proportions, and fractional data. 
Applications of this model have been applied to study 401(k) retirement plan participation rates, 
Gini index values for the prices of art, and the probability of a defendant’s guilt and the verdict. 
Of particular interest is Papke and Wooldridge (2008) who studied the fourth-grade math test 
pass rates in Michigan from 1992 through 2001 attempting to show the effects of the 1994 
Proposal A which dramatically changed the way Michigan schools were funded. 
 Fractional response methods for dependent variables in [0,1] avoid model 
misspecification and predictions falling outside the interval as is possible in a standard OLS. 
Additionally, the method captures nonlinear relationships especially when the dependent 
variable is close to 0 or 1. This method is appropriate in this analysis as my data is on the 
 39 
 
proportion of students in each school that passed the state exams rather than the data on whether 
individual students passed an exam.  
Fractional regression is a model of the mean of the dependent variable 𝑦 conditional on 
covariates X, denoted 𝜇𝑋. Since 𝑦 is in [0,1], it must be assured that 𝜇𝑋 is also in [0,1]. To do 
this, a probit or logit model is used for 𝜇𝑋. In this case, I follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) 
and assume the functional form of the expected exam pass rate is a standard normal cumulative 
distribution function, Φ( ∙ ) and 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑿𝒊𝒕,  𝑐𝑖𝑡) =  Φ(𝐗𝒊𝒕β + 𝑐𝑖) for cross-sectional observation 
i in time t where y is the dependent variable in [0,1], X is a set of explanatory variables and c is 
the unobserved effect (p. 122-123). The model is estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QML) method, a more general application of maximum likelihood estimation. The QML 
method differs from maximum likelihood estimation in that the specifying density function may 
not be the correct one. In the traditional ML method, the specified density function is assumed 
to be the true density function, so the specification errors are assumed away.  
The log-likelihood function which is maximized for fractional models takes the form 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 =  ∑ 𝑦𝑗ln {𝐺(𝐗𝒋β)}
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ (1 − 𝑦𝑗)ln {1 − 𝐺(𝐗𝒋β)} 
where N is the sample size, 𝑦𝑗 is the dependent variable, and 𝐗𝒋 are the covariates for individual 
j. For a fractional probit model, G(.) takes the form of Φ(𝐗𝒊𝒕β) where Φ is the standard normal 
cumulative density function.  
Following the works of Jackson, Johnson and Persico (2015) and Hyman (2014), the 
following linear model is specified.  
 
𝑌𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑠𝑡 is the educational attainment of school s in time t. In this case, the dependent 
variable is the percent of students in each school in each year who passed the 4th grade ELA or 
math exam. Two models will be estimated in each year—one for each exam. The independent 
variables are: log (𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡)—the log of per pupil spending of school s in time t, 𝑋𝑠𝑡— a vector 
of student demographics (race, percent of student receiving free lunch or reduced price lunch, 
percent of ELLs), 𝑍𝑠𝑡— a vector of teacher characteristics (the percent of teachers with a 
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Master’s degree or more, the percent of teachers with fewer than 3 years of experience, the 
percent of teachers with no valid certification, and the 5-year teacher turnover percent), and 
𝑆𝑠𝑡—a vector of school characteristics including the student-teacher ratio, the total enrollment 
and the average attendance rate. The attendance rate was normalized by dividing by the average 
attendance in that year to account for very few observations below 75 percent.  Finally, 𝜖𝑠𝑡 is the 
error term.   
However, since the dependent variable—exam pass rates—is bounded in [0,1], I 
transform equation (1) to a fractional probit model with the following form:  
 
𝐸(𝑌𝑠𝑡) =  Φ(ψ𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1log (𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡)  (2) 
 
I run the above model for the years 1999, 2006 and 2014. I choose 1999 as the first year 
I have data and far enough away from the CFE case that will serve as a useful baseline. This is 
also the initial year high stakes testing was mandated in 4th grade. The year 2006 is the year 
right before the mandates from the CFE case took effect. Finally, 2014 is the year in which New 
York City finally received all its promised funding increase. The funding was meant to be 
phased in over a four-year period, however due to the recession in 2008, the state was unable to 
fulfill this promise. Instead, by 2014, New York City schools were finally being funded $1.93 
billion more than in 2006.  
 
4.7 Marginal Explanatory Values 
 In an ordinary least squares regression, the t-statistics are used in deciding if the 
independent variable is statistically significant in explaining the dependent variable. However, 
the validity of this approach is subject to numerous conditions: there must be a true equation of 
the exact form of the estimated equation, the independent variables X are a priori known, X 
must be non-stochastic, the errors must be uncorrelated with each other, have all the same 
variance, and be normal (Almon 1999, 8). Additionally, t-statistics and standard errors are 
highly sensitive to sample size. Small standard errors are meant to assure us that the variable’s 
sign is true, yet it can be hard to tell if this is due to the correct speciation of the model or the 
large sample size. Almon (1997) suggests the use of marginal expletory values, or mexval, 
instead. These measurements provide an alternative way of evaluating a variable by measuring 
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how much the sum of square residuals, SSR, increases when that variable is dropped from the 
model. Another way to consider this is to ask, “by what percent the standard error of estimate 
goes up by when the variable is eliminated, and all others adjust to compensate as best they can 
for the elimination” (Almon 1997, 9). This measure, mexval, can be found through the 
following equation, 
𝑚 = 100 (√1 + 
𝑡2
𝑇 − 𝑛
− 1) 
 
where t is the t-statistic, T is the number of observations, and n is the number of parameters 
estimated. I will use this measure to determine which of explanatory variables explains the most 
variance in student exam pass rates.  
 
4.8 Counterfactuals: 
While the above analysis will be useful in determining how each explanatory variable 
affects the pass rate on the exams for each year, it will do little in explaining if the funding 
increase to New York City schools had any effect in altering the pass rates or in causing more 
schools to be successful. To answer these questions, I create counterfactual estimates. 
Counterfactuals are hypothetical situations which allow me to ask and answer what if the 
funding structures seen in 1999 (and 2006) were the same as those in 2014? What effect would 
this have on test pass rates?  
To answer such questions, I run my model in 2014 and save the predicted values. Then I 
change 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 for each school to the per pupil spending observed for that school in 1999 (or 
2006). I then predict the 2014 model again with the spend variables from 1999 (or 2006) to see 
what the exam pass rates would have been if the per pupil spending at each school had not 
changed over the period.  
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4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Fractional Probit Model Results 
Table four shows the conditional marginal effects4 on the 4th grade ELA exam pass rates, 
reported as first derivatives, at the mean values of each explanatory variable. I have called these 
QML since they are derived from quasi maximum likelihood estimation. These results are 
compared to the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the same variables.  Table 
five shows the same information for the 4th grade math exam. 
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects- ELA Exam 
  1999 2006 2014 
Variable   QML OLS QML OLS QML OLS 
Log Per Capita    -0.103*** -0.111*** -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.091** -0.084*** 
Spending  (0.028) (0.034) (0.065) (0.055) (0.045) (0.038) 
        
Total Enrollment  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Student Teacher  0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Ratio  (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Attendance Rate  1.320*** 1.382*** 1.120*** 1.070*** 2.086*** 2.278*** 
  (0.179) (0.180) (0.225) (0.224) (0.345) (0.296) 
        
Percent ELL  0.085 0.079* -0.107* -0.112* -0.304*** -0.327*** 
 
 (0.056) (0.047) (0.063) (0.063) (0.053) (0.055) 
        
Percent FRPL  -0.014 -0.015 -0.158*** -0.094*** -0.219*** -0.124*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.042) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) 
        
Percent Black  -0.030* -0.030* -0.264*** -0.255*** -0.173*** -0.154*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
        
Percent Hispanic  -0.003 -0.002 -0.238*** -0.230*** -0.169*** -0.152*** 
 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
                                                          
4 The full maximum likelihood estimation results are included in the Appendix in tables C to H.  
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Percent Asian  -0.018 -0.025 0.081* 0.059 0.014 0.022 
 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.045) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039) 
        
5-year Turnover   0.013 0.014 -0.035 -0.028 0.015 0.011 
Rate  (0.015) (0.016) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) 
        
Percent Masters  0.017 0.014 -0.001 0.002 -0.043 -0.008 
 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.051) (0.044) (0.038) (0.040) 
        
Percent No  -0.181*** -0.209*** -0.197 -0.254* 0.469 0.376 
Certification  (0.068) (0.069) (0.169) (0.150) (0.516) (0.497) 
        
Percent < 3 
Years’ 
 -0.013 -0.012 -0.118 -0.103* -0.026 -0.013 
Experience   (0.027) (0.028) (0.073) (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) 
N   600 582 591 
standard errors in parentheses      
Margins are significant at: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*) 
 
Table 5: Marginal Effects- Math Exam 
  1999 2006 2014 
Variable QML OLS QML OLS QML OLS 
Log Per Capita -0.207*** -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.100** -0.096*** 
Spending (0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.048) (0.041) 
       
Total Enrollment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Student Teacher 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.001 
Ratio (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Attendance Rate 3.734*** 3.450*** 1.150*** 1.135*** 2.814*** 3.121*** 
  (0.339) (0.252) (0.221) (0.210) (0.344) (0.318) 
        
Percent ELL -0.395*** -0.360*** -0.193*** -0.209*** -0.305*** -0.326*** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.054) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) 
       
Percent FRPL 0.012 0.013 -0.037 -0.000 -0.156*** -0.048 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.031) (0.039) (0.041) 
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Percent Black -0.315*** -0.290*** -0.294*** -0.274*** -0.290*** -0.269*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) 
       
Percent Hispanic -0.210*** -0.193*** -0.240*** -0.215*** -0.202*** -0.175*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) 
       
Percent Asian 0.005 0.006 0.080** 0.049 0.039 0.018 
 (0.046) (0.042) (0.035) (0.033) (0.040) (0.042) 
       
5-year Turnover 0.026 0.025 -0.054 -0.051 0.010 0.004 
Rate (0.022) (0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) 
       
Percent Masters -0.051* -0.047 0.005 0.001 -0.114*** -0.072* 
 (0.031) (0.097) (0.047) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) 
       
Percent No -0.141 -0.145 0.086 -0.015 0.636 0.486 
Certification (0.107) (0.097) (0.148) (0.141) (0.628) (0.533) 
       
Percent <3 Years’ 0.031 0.029 -0.108 -0.092 -0.063 -0.051 
Experience (0.042) (0.039) (0.069) (0.059) (0.067) (0.066) 
N 600 582 591 
standard errors in parentheses          
Margins are significant at: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*) 
 
The marginal effect of the log of per capita spending, the primary variable of interest, is 
essentially zero for all years for both exams. Since per capita spending is in log form, a one 
percent increase in total per capita spending at the mean would result in ELA exam scores 0.10 
percentage points lower in 1999, 0.23 percentage points lower in 2006 and 0.09 percentage 
points lower in 2014 using the average partial effects. With the OLS model, a one percentage 
point increase in total spending would have 0.11, 0.22 and 0.08 percentage point decrease on 
ELA exam pass rates in 1999, 2006 and 2014, respectively. The math exams are no different. A 
one percent increase in total per pupil spending at the mean will decrease the exam pass rates 
between 0.10 and 0.21 percentage points, depending on the year or model. All these results are 
statistically significant, at the 5 percent confidence level.  
This is a somewhat counterintuitive result, however. It is commonly believed that 
increased spending should lead to increased student results and these results suggest that 
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increased spending has almost no effect, and that if anything, increased total per pupil spending 
slightly decreases exam pass rates. This may be explained by the fact that this variable is 
aggregated; it captures all school spending including that on line items which probably have no 
effect on student test scores. One can think of schools spending more on custodial or 
administrative staff, debt payments, or central admin. All of these are important yet likely have 
little effect on student pass rates on standardized tests. This corresponds with the literature 
which suggests that often aggregated spending categories are not statistically different between 
successful and unsuccessful schools (see Chellman and Weinstein 2005).  
The other explanatory variables which produce significant (statistically) results are: total 
enrollment, attendance rate, the percent of English Language Learners, the percent of students 
receiving free or reduced-price lunch, the racial markup of the student body, the percent of 
teachers with no valid certification, and the percent of teachers with Masters degrees. Although 
student enrollment is statistically significant, it has zero effect on student pass rates for both 
exams, in every year, in every model. Attendance, however, has larger effects and is statistically 
significant in every year for both exams. A one percent increase in a school’s attendance above 
the mean attendance rate has large positive effects on student pass rates—between 1.1 and 3.7 
percentage points gain depending on the year, model and exam. This result is expected for two 
reasons. First, intuitively, if students are at school more it seems likely that they will have better 
test scores. Second, attendance is a good proxy for school environment which the literature 
suggests is an important driver of student success. Student are more likely to want to attend 
school if there is a positive environment and students who go to schools with positive 
environments are more likely to achieve.  
Student demographics are also significant in explaining exam pass rates. For instance, 
the percentage of English Language Learners has a negative effect on exam scores and is 
significant in 2006 and 2014 for the English exam and in all years for the math exam. In 2006, if 
the mean ELL population increases by 1 percent, ELA exam pass rates would decrease 0.11 
percentage points. The same increase translates to a decrease in pass rates by 0.3 percentage 
points in 2014. This result makes sense since it is reasonable to believe that as the percentage of 
students who are not fluent in English increase the pass rate on an English exam would go 
down.  
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The result is the same for the math exam—that is, as the mean percentage of English 
Language Learners increase, the pass rate on the math exam decreases. The result is significant 
in all years with a 1 percent increase in mean ELL population leading to a 0.40, 0.19, and 0.31 
percentage point decrease in pass rate for 1999, 2006, and 2014, respectively. Although we 
might expect the decline in math pass rates to be smaller than the decline in ELA rates, it makes 
little difference. Classroom instruction and both exams are still in English which means English 
Language Learners are likely to perform worse than native English speakers. These results are 
mirrored for both exams in the OLS results.  
The percentage of students on free and reduced-price lunch, a proxy for a school’s 
poverty status, is highly statistically significant for the ELA exam in 2006 and 2014 and the 
math exam in the QML model for math in 2014. In 2006, as the mean population of FRPL 
students increases by 1 percent, the ELA exam pass rate decreases 0.16 percentage points. The 
effect is larger for both exams in 2014: an increase in FRPL students of 1 percent decreases pass 
rates by 0.22 percentage points for ELA and 0.16 percentage points for math. This result is 
consistent with the literature which shows that socioeconomic status is still one of, if not the 
most important contributor to student success.  
Student’s race/ethnicity is also highly statistically significant for both exams. As the 
percent of black and Hispanic students increases, the ELA exam pass rates reliably decrease 
between 0.03 and 0.26 percentage points while the math exam pass rates decrease is more, 
between 0.18 and 0.32 percentage points. Conversely, the percent of Asian students is only 
significant in 2006 where it positively correlated with both ELA and math exam pass rates—
around 0.08 percentage points for each 1 percent increase in the mean population. Interestingly, 
although the percent of black and Hispanic students is statistically significant and negative in 
every year, the marginal effects are larger for the math exams. This may be due to stereotype 
threat which the literature shows can negatively affect minority and female performance on 
standardized tests (see Holme et al. 2010).  
Teacher characteristics are generally not statistically different from zero with two 
exceptions: the percent of teachers with a master’s degree or more for the 1999 and 2014 math 
exam and the percent of teachers with no valid certification in 1999 and 2006 for the ELA 
exam. Both show negative relationships. A one percent increase in teachers without certification 
at the mean reduces exam scores between 0.18 and 0.25 percentage points. This is an expected 
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result as teachers with no form of valid certification are the least educated in quality teaching 
strategies and generally have the least experience in the classroom. These teachers are also the 
cheapest to hire and probably work in the poorest school districts. A one percent increase in 
teachers with higher education reduces math exam pass rates between 0.05 and 0.11 percentage 
points. This result is less expected as it is conventionally thought that more educated teachers 
will have better results. However, there are two possible explanations. First, more educated 
teachers may spend less time on test prep and more time on actual instruction that may not 
translate into higher test pass rates. Second, the data does not distinguish between teachers with 
a master’s in education and master’s in other subjects. 
The remainder of the variables—the student-teacher ratio, the five-year turnover rate, 
and the percent of teachers with less than three years of experience are not statistically different 
from zero for both exams. 
 
4.2 Marginal Explanatory Value Results 
 Table six presents the measures of the marginal explanatory value of each independent 
variable. The larger the value, the more the variable explains the variance in student exam pass 
rates. The main variable of interest, the log of per pupil spending, never explains the most 
variance in outcome but it is in the top four variables with most marginal explanatory power in 
1999 and 2006 for both exams. In 2014, the log of per pupil expenditure has little marginal 
explanatory value.  
From these results, the two most important variables for explaining the variance in exam 
pass rates are attendance rate and student race. Attendance explains the most variance in the 
outcome in 1999 and 2014 while in 2006, race, particularly the percent of black and Hispanic 
students, explains the most variance in outcome. In some years for some tests, the percentage of 
English Language Learners also explain a large amount of the variance. The percent of teacher 
with no certification has relatively high marginal expletory value in the 1999 ELA exam but not 
for other years or exams.  
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Table 6: Marginal Explanatory Values (Mexval) 
 1999 2006 2014 
  ELA Math ELA Math ELA Math 
Log Per Pupil Expenditure 0.912 1.401 1.389 1.452 0.418 0.473 
Enrollment 0.574 0.874 0.658 0.170 0.057 0.011 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.008 0.062 0.012 0.056 0.103 0.014 
Attendance Rate 4.891 14.840 1.988 2.530 4.991 8.005 
Percent ELL 0.240 2.499 0.278 1.095 2.977 2.565 
Percent FRPL 0.099 0.039 0.691 0.000 0.915 0.120 
Percent Black 0.232 10.429 5.595 7.271 1.721 4.508 
Percent Hispanic 0.001 3.451 3.333 3.302 1.388 1.594 
Percent Asian 0.060 0.001 0.180 0.137 0.027 0.015 
5-Year Turnover Rate 0.064 0.107 0.059 0.216 0.021 0.003 
Percent Masters 0.034 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.244 
Percent No Certification 0.774 0.189 0.251 0.001 0.050 0.072 
Percent < 3 Years’ Expr. 0.015 0.048 0.233 0.211 0.003 0.051 
Constant 0.115 0.194 0.793 0.857 0.080 0.374 
 
 These results generally reflect the findings from both the quasi maximum likelihood and 
the OLS estimation. In both these models, attendance and race was highly statistically 
significant in all years for all exams. The high marginal explanatory values of these variables 
reiterate that both student race and attendance rate is important in explaining the variance of 
student exam pass rates. Per pupil expenditure was also highly significant in the QML and OLS 
model. The mexval results show that this variable does explain some of the variance in test pass 
rates, though not as much race, attendance rate, and often the percent of English Language 
Learners.  
 
4.3 Counterfactual Results 
Table seven reports the counterfactuals for the ELA exam pass rates in each year while 
table eight reports the same for the math exam. Results from both the QML and OLS are 
reported. Along the diagonal in each table—formatted in bold—are the actual average exam 
pass rates in each year. For example, on average, the ELA exam pass rate in 2006 was 59.84 
percent. The rest of the percentages show various counterfactuals. The rows apply different 
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years of per capita spending5 to the remaining characteristics in the column years. This shows 
what the exam pass rates would have been with different funding structures from different years. 
For instance, the average 2006 ELA exam pass rate would have been 72.39 in the QML model 
or 73.56 percent in the OLS model if all the characteristics from 2006 remained the same but the 
per capita spending was that observed in 1999. 
 
Table 7: ELA Exam Pass Rates 
 1999 2006 2014 
  MLE OLS MLE OLS MLE OLS 
PP Spending 1999 35.49% 35.49% 72.39% 73.56% 75.15% 75.22% 
PP Spending 2006   59.84% 59.84% 71.48% 71.37% 
PP Spending 2014     68.56% 68.56% 
       
 
Table 8: Math Exam Pass Rates 
   
                                        1999 2006 2014 
  MLE OLS MLE OLS MLE OLS 
PP Spending 1999 51.93% 51.93% 81.86% 83.75% 77.09% 77.51% 
PP Spending 2006   72.16% 72.16% 73.15% 73.12% 
PP Spending 2014     69.98% 69.98% 
 
Comparing the counterfactuals to the actual exam pass rates shows some counterintuitive 
results. It is commonly believed that more per pupil spending will lead to better student 
achievement. The data shows that this is not always the case. For both exams and models, the 
pass rates would have been slightly higher in 2014 if per capita spending remained at the 2006 
or 1999 level.  
There are explanations for this. First, as mentioned previously, my variable of interest is 
total per pupil spending. This level of detail makes it impossible to tell whether schools are 
consistently spending their increased funds on classroom instruction or ancillary services, 
regional or system-wide costs. If the latter is true, it would not be unreasonable to expect that 
the student exam scores may be higher using a previous year’s funding structure.  
                                                          
5 Although the per capita spending from each individual school was used to create the counterfactuals, for 
reference, the average per capita spending per school in New York City was $9,770.65 in 1999, $15,868.33 in 
2006, and $21,398.37 in 2014.  
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Second, my model is incomplete. I accounted for everything I believed would impact 
student exam pass rates but was limited by my access to data. Beyond the lack of disaggregated 
spending data, I have no information about parent involvement which could be important 
especially with elementary school students. I also have limited data on student socioeconomic 
status such as parent’s education, employment, etc. One of the significant variables in my model 
was the percent of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch which I used as a proxy for 
poverty. Perhaps if this was more fully modeled we would see different results. Lastly, to model 
the intangible “school environment,” I used proxies such as student attendance and staff 
turnover. Better variables to use here may have come from qualitative surveys of student and 
staff but this was unavailable to me at the school level in each year I wished to study.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Given the substantial amount of money spent on public education in country it is vital to 
understand the effects of such spending on student achievement. Since the 1970s, per pupil 
school spending has risen significantly—much of this in response to court-ordered school 
finance reform. Reforms from the 1970s to the 1980s aimed to reduce resource disparity across 
districts and increase equity. Since the 1990s, reforms have been adequacy reforms aimed to 
achieve sufficient funding in low income districts.  
Such reforms are necessary as schools across socio-economic landscape and 
neighborhood are still not funded equally. Districts with a large proportion of poor students 
continue to receive less revenue than districts with wealthier students. In districts with the most 
intra-district inequality, students of color and poor students receive between $300 and $500 less 
than their non-poor, white counterparts (Ejdemry and Shores 2017, 2). Additionally, schools 
with fewer low-income, high-need students often get the most experienced teachers and staff 
while high-need schools are stuck with inexperienced and uncertified teachers.  
New York State attempted to level the playing field in the landmark case the Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York which found that New York City was not funding its 
schools at such a level as to provide all students with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic 
education. In 2006, the court ordered New York State to provide an additional $1.93 billion to 
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New York City schools. This number was arrived at by looking at the minimum spending levels 
of “successful schools” in the region—those which had 80 percent or more of their students 
passing the 4th grade ELA and math exam or five or more high school Regents exams. The 
money was meant to be phased in over a four-year period. However, due to fiscal constraints 
placed on the state because of the Great Recession, the CFE money was not fully phased in until 
2014.  
The purpose of this paper was to examine the effects of this increased spending in New 
York City schools on the 4th grade ELA and math exam pass rates. On average, New York City 
elementary schools are still not “successful” in 2014 as the average pass rate on these state 
exams was only seventy percent. However, the average pass rates have been rising since 1999 
though total per pupil spending seems to have played little role.  
Results from both fractional probit models and OLS models show that total per pupil 
spending has marginally small, negative effects on student exam pass rates. A one percent 
increase in total per pupil spending at the mean will decrease the exam pass rates between 0.1 
and 0.3 percentage points, depending on the year and model. The percent of English Language 
Learners, the percent of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch, the percent of black and 
Hispanic student and the percent of teachers with no valid certification are also all negatively 
correlated with exam pass rates and statistically significant. The only statistically significant 
explanatory variable which had a positive effect on student pass rates is the average attendance 
rate. This may be because attendance reflects school environment which reflects achievement; 
the higher the attendance, the more positive the environment, the greater the student 
achievement.  
Through creating counterfactual estimates, I was able to see what the average exam pass 
rates would have been in 2014 with per pupil spending remaining unchanged at either the 1999 
or 2006 level. The ELA exam pass rates in 2014 would have been roughly 2.8 percentage points 
higher with the spending structure from 2006 and roughly 6.5 percentage points higher with the 
funding from 1999. For math the results are similar: with the funding from 2006 pass rates 
would have been roughly 3.2 percentage points higher, and 7.3 percentage points higher using 
1999 funding.  
This may be a counterintuitive result, but it is not necessarily out of line with past 
research.  In a review of 163 studies of total per pupil expenditure on student performance, 
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Hanushek (1997) found that only 27 percent of studies found positive, statistically significant 
marginal effects. Twenty six percent of studies found negative relationships, both significant 
and not (7 percent significant, 19 percent insignificant). The remainder had either unknown 
signs or positive, though statistically insignificant results. This is because there is no guarantee 
that a school with more funds will use that money effectively. Others have also shown that how 
the money is spent is more important than how much funding a school receives (Boser 2011, 
Greene et. al 2007, Wenglinsky 1997).  
Thus, my results seem to confirm inefficiency in school spending and are a call for 
further research. My analysis is my limitation in data access and the subsequent use of total per 
pupil spending instead of more disaggregated spending. The literature, and my results, have 
confirmed that aggregated levels of spending do not have the best explanatory power on student 
achievement. More research is needed at the individual school level in New York City with 
finer levels of school expenditure. It is imperative to see where increased funding is being spent 
to make any claims regarding the value of increased educational funding. Perhaps all the 
increased funding between 2006 and 2014 was spent on ancillary, regional or system-wide 
costs. This would explain why there is a negative relationship between this increased funding 
and student exam pass rates.  
Further, more research is needed in defining what a “successful school” truly is. This 
analysis used the court’s definition that a successful school is one in which at least 80 percent of 
students pass the 4th grade math and ELA exams. However, there is a large body of literature 
(see Seegol et al. 2013; Holme et al. 2010; Geiser and Santelices 2007; and Rumberger and 
Palardy 2005) which suggests that standardized tests are not the best measure of student success. 
These exams show us what students can do in a one-sitting, multi-hour, high-stress 
environment. Students suffer from tremendous test anxiety on standardized tests. Plus, 
minorities and girls often face stereotype threat and perform disproportionately worse on these 
types of exams. Similar analysis needs to be done with other metrics of student learning—GPA, 
graduation rate, drop-out rate, etc. to find if the increased funding had positive effects in other 
important areas of student achievement.  
The aim of this analysis was to determine the effects of increased state funding because 
of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York on New York City students. My 
results suggest that simply throwing money at the problem has little positive effect on student 
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and school success which has opened more doors for further investigation. With more than 1.1 
million students taught in over 1,700 public schools, it remains vitally important to continue 
research into what can make New York City schools as successful as possible.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Imputation Results for 1999 Student Demographics Compared to Education 
Demographic and Geographic Estimates (EDGE) data from 2000 Census by NYC 
Community School District 
 
 
 
District EDGE Impute Impute Impute Impute Impute
1 55.52 67.55 2.14 21.05 10.2 0.84
2 22.66 24.93 31.82 15.11 32.28 0.4
3 34.37 52.68 16.11 31.64 4.5 0.29
4 61.59 61.92 0.79 34.42 2.71 0.67
5 31.14 12.06 0.63 88.5 0.98 0.25
6 81.81 91.7 0.53 7.54 0.7 0
7 67.1 67.02 0.31 32.96 1.58 0
8 60.66 58.48 4.55 33.78 3.35 0.55
9 60.44 60.88 0.72 36.78 1.28 0.69
10 66.41 65.21 9.93 19.09 5.49 0.5
11 34.75 27.33 5.6 62.08 4.99 0.58
12 63.43 67.76 0.67 30.76 0.9 0.21
13 19.78 16.74 0.92 85.49 1.01 0.7
14 60.26 63.05 11.71 23.92 2.23 0.24
15 51.52 55.86 15.06 24.68 7.64 0.99
16 15.15 8.66 1 90.44 0.5 1.44
17 10.77 3.09 0.81 95.41 0.6 1.14
18 7.41 4.69 1.35 92.5 1.24 0.43
19 39.6 39.54 0.81 54.99 5.43 0.33
20 21.71 13.89 45.79 2.93 37.29 0.61
21 18.45 16.21 41.32 14.53 28.04 0
22 11.92 11.36 31.54 47.88 9.38 0.29
23 19.31 15.25 0 83.63 1.88 1
24 57.25 54.39 22.37 3.42 19.45 0.07
25 24.31 23.8 30.14 7.42 38.97 0.26
26 10.21 9.51 35.32 7.99 48.42 0.26
27 30.87 33.96 9.01 36.63 22.46 0.72
28 20.1 24.04 19.98 31.64 28.49 0.24
29 11.99 11.35 2.64 77.24 9.83 0.24
30 47.4 49.38 14.79 9.74 26.27 0.4
31 18.84 15.35 61.37 16.36 7.58 0.77
32 69.55 71.88 1.19 24.9 2.18 0.43
EDGE EDGE EDGEEDGE
58.28 14.77 5.51 0.2
1.39 24.35 1.96 0.18
2.69 69.5 8.24 0.51
16.34 11.68 18.35 0.44
15.53 33.61 9.32 0.95
16.76 37.6 16.41 0.49
27.8 5.49 36.37 0.14
37 4.11 43.88 0.45
0.15 77.41 0.64 0.15
20.05 2.71 16.8 0.16
43.67 14.5 19.88 0.19
29.41 45.39 8.72 0.18
2.01 51.99 2.85 0.43
42.19 2.24 27.82 0.08
2.42 83.16 0.57 0.13
3.53 83.64 2.48 0.26
20.46 10.16 13.01 0.31
0.26 82.24 0.63 0.22
4.22 69.98 1.72 0.08
14.75 18.14 2.99 0.05
7.57 49.32 3.79 0.41
2.02 30.72 0.96 0.71
1.07 35.2 0.71 0.69
6.07 21.27 3.66 0.12
0.62 29.8 0.4 0.7
8.6 26.96 1.41 0.44
0.54 64.79 1.24 0.21
4.58 10.71 0.8 0.38
21.18 37.85 2.63 0.03
0.93 33.97 0.8 0.13
5.79 13.64 22.88 0.38
34.03 9.5 29.64 0.08
% Hispanic % White % Black % Asian % Am. Indian
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Table B: Imputation Results for 1999 Teacher Statistics Compared to Personnel Master 
File (PMF) data from 2001 by NYC Community School District 
 
 
Percent 
Turnov
er
%  
Outside 
Cert.
District
Impute PMF
Impute 
(less 
than 3)
PMF 
(less 
than 5)
Impute PMF Impute Impute
1 6.70 17.90 24.05 24.10 32.36 34.00 -5.89 25.29
2 3.22 12.80 27.91 20.00 27.63 39.80 21.24 14.56
3 5.09 19.70 20.55 34.40 35.20 39.90 41.77 15.88
4 4.75 22.30 -2.50 44.90 21.58 32.50 22.50 23.08
5 9.61 19.90 14.75 36.60 28.05 34.30 24.30 15.92
6 8.00 19.70 15.54 35.50 24.13 27.60 31.46 28.80
7 13.17 20.30 14.58 43.20 21.06 28.10 51.50 19.67
8 11.25 19.40 29.48 38.60 21.10 32.60 37.77 22.32
9 16.63 20.70 15.78 36.40 18.99 33.10 39.95 34.13
10 9.83 20.70 30.61 28.80 20.74 2.90 39.72 30.68
11 4.75 15.80 21.77 25.60 23.04 30.50 22.30 14.53
12 11.46 21.50 25.49 20.50 12.19 32.00 19.83 27.31
13 6.85 17.10 18.08 18.70 12.51 33.40 28.68 22.54
14 5.39 16.00 16.51 35.60 22.14 31.20 25.89 17.42
15 6.61 17.30 25.23 33.70 25.00 32.60 25.98 19.19
16 15.06 14.70 23.22 41.60 8.06 35.60 38.75 25.91
17 9.86 15.70 14.46 27.70 22.84 27.00 27.00 27.19
18 3.24 15.70 19.73 37.50 12.55 26.40 24.22 13.84
19 11.25 19.00 32.88 39.00 8.51 27.90 32.42 26.27
20 3.42 14.50 18.98 27.70 21.39 26.30 7.69 16.99
21 2.91 17.60 11.60 27.70 31.46 25.60 19.62 20.12
22 3.29 13.20 23.58 32.10 13.85 28.90 12.64 14.79
23 18.75 18.40 46.88 40.40 -0.50 30.20 52.50 31.25
24 3.89 14.70 16.95 34.90 23.68 31.30 11.38 14.19
25 2.86 13.40 5.13 22.10 53.78 24.10 14.54 9.42
26 1.94 13.20 15.95 19.70 46.09 25.20 9.49 8.76
27 4.09 13.50 22.78 32.60 21.92 30.20 19.44 15.60
28 3.38 12.00 17.42 23.10 33.92 32.00 22.37 14.02
29 3.13 15.20 17.62 24.50 28.08 27.90 30.56 8.31
30 3.17 15.30 18.35 20.30 36.43 32.40 20.87 16.84
31 3.41 13.50 11.41 21.80 43.71 25.00 3.31 12.79
32 5.97 17.70 18.04 33.80 12.78 29.90 22.89 18.25
Percent          
Masters
Percent No 
Certifcation
Percent Years of    
Experience
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Tables C-H: Fractional Probit Regression Output Tables  
 
Table C: ELA Proficiency- 1999      
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending -0.368 0.102 -3.620 0.000 -0.567 -0.169 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.004 0.006 0.640 0.524 -0.008 0.016 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -3.010 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 4.742 0.641 7.400 0.000 3.486 5.997 
Percent ELL 0.306 0.202 1.520 0.130 -0.090 0.701 
Percent FRPL -0.051 0.046 -1.100 0.273 -0.142 0.040 
Percent Black -0.109 0.061 -1.790 0.073 -0.228 0.010 
Percent Hispanic -0.011 0.080 -0.130 0.895 -0.167 0.146 
Percent Asian -0.063 0.104 -0.610 0.542 -0.266 0.140 
Percent No Certification -0.649 0.244 -2.660 0.008 -1.128 -0.170 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. -0.045 0.097 -0.470 0.640 -0.235 0.145 
Percent Masters 0.061 0.073 0.830 0.408 -0.083 0.205 
Percent Turnover 0.046 0.054 0.860 0.389 -0.059 0.152 
Constant -0.405 1.265 -0.320 0.749 -2.884 2.074 
Number of obs = 600       
Wald chi2(13) = 364.20      
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000      
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0206       
 
Table D: ELA Proficiency- 2006      
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending 0.168 -3.350 0.001 -0.894 -0.234 -0.234 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.008 0.014 0.570 0.566 -0.020 0.036 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -3.100 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 2.920 0.586 4.980 0.000 1.772 4.068 
Percent ELL -0.279 0.163 -1.710 0.088 -0.600 0.041 
Percent FRPL -0.346 0.105 -3.310 0.001 -0.551 -0.141 
Percent Black -0.687 0.090 -7.640 0.000 -0.864 -0.511 
Percent Hispanic -0.620 0.109 -5.710 0.000 -0.834 -0.407 
Percent Asian 0.210 0.118 1.790 0.074 -0.020 0.440 
Percent No Certification -0.513 0.439 -1.170 0.243 -1.374 0.348 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. -0.307 0.191 -1.610 0.107 -0.681 0.067 
Percent Masters -0.003 0.132 -0.020 0.983 -0.262 0.256 
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Percent Turnover -0.091 0.091 -1.000 0.316 -0.270 0.087 
Constant 3.639 1.966 1.850 0.064 -0.215 7.493 
Number of obs = 582       
Wald chi2(13) = 1212.93      
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000       
Pseudo R2 = 0.0696       
 
Table E: ELA Proficiency- 2014      
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending -0.262 0.131 -2.000 0.046 -0.519 -0.005 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.005 0.003 1.530 0.127 -0.001 0.012 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -1.460 0.143 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 6.039 0.998 6.050 0.000 4.082 7.996 
Percent ELL -0.880 0.153 -5.760 0.000 -1.180 -0.581 
Percent FRPL -0.633 0.109 -5.800 0.000 -0.847 -0.419 
Percent Black -0.502 0.097 -5.170 0.000 -0.692 -0.312 
Percent Hispanic -0.489 0.105 -4.670 0.000 -0.694 -0.284 
Percent Asian 0.042 0.107 0.390 0.698 -0.169 0.252 
Percent No Certification 1.358 1.494 0.910 0.364 -1.571 4.287 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. -0.075 0.191 -0.390 0.695 -0.449 0.300 
Percent Masters -0.125 0.110 -1.130 0.258 -0.342 0.091 
Percent Turnover 0.043 0.071 0.600 0.548 -0.096 0.182 
Constant -1.928 1.757 -1.100 0.273 -5.371 1.516 
Number of obs = 591       
Wald chi2(13) = 1161.61      
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000       
Pseudo R2 = 0.0759       
 
       
Table F: Math Proficiency- 1999      
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending -0.519 0.123 -4.220 0.000 -0.760 -0.278 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.006 0.008 -0.780 0.434 -0.021 0.009 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -3.520 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 9.378 0.852 11.000 0.000 7.708 11.048 
Percent ELL -0.993 0.171 -5.810 0.000 -1.328 -0.658 
Percent FRPL 0.029 0.050 0.590 0.557 -0.069 0.127 
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Percent Black -0.791 0.070 -11.250 0.000 -0.929 -0.653 
Percent Hispanic -0.527 0.088 -5.990 0.000 -0.699 -0.354 
Percent Asian 0.012 0.116 0.100 0.919 -0.215 0.238 
Percent No 
Certification -0.355 0.270 -1.320 0.188 -0.884 0.174 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. 0.078 0.105 0.740 0.459 -0.128 0.284 
Percent Masters -0.128 0.077 -1.670 0.096 -0.280 0.023 
Percent Turnover 0.065 0.055 1.170 0.241 -0.044 0.173 
Constant -3.725 1.611 -2.310 0.021 -6.882 -0.567 
Number of obs = 600       
Wald chi2(13) = 1251.65      
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000       
Pseudo R2 = 0.0875       
 
 
Table G: Math Proficiency- 2006      
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending -0.608 0.160 -3.810 0.000 -0.921 -0.295 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.005 0.012 -0.400 0.686 -0.027 0.018 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -1.860 0.062 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 3.561 0.684 5.210 0.000 2.220 4.901 
Percent ELL -0.597 0.168 -3.560 0.000 -0.926 -0.268 
Percent FRPL -0.116 0.094 -1.230 0.219 -0.300 0.069 
Percent Black -0.911 0.092 -9.920 0.000 -1.091 -0.731 
Percent Hispanic -0.744 0.112 -6.660 0.000 -0.962 -0.525 
Percent Asian 0.247 0.121 2.040 0.041 0.010 0.484 
Percent No Certification 0.267 0.458 0.580 0.560 -0.631 1.165 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. -0.334 0.214 -1.560 0.118 -0.753 0.085 
Percent Masters -0.016 0.145 -0.110 0.912 -0.300 0.268 
Percent Turnover -0.166 0.109 -1.520 0.128 -0.379 0.048 
Constant 3.901 1.914 2.040 0.042 0.149 7.653 
Number of obs = 582       
Wald chi2(13) = 1202.24      
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000       
Pseudo R2  = 0.0724       
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Table H: Math Proficiency- 2014 
       
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Log Per Pupil Spending -0.300 0.144 -2.090 0.037 -0.582 -0.018 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.004 0.004 0.970 0.332 -0.004 0.011 
Total Enrollment 0.000 0.000 -1.120 0.261 0.000 0.000 
Attendance Rate 8.473 1.038 8.160 0.000 6.438 10.507 
Percent ELL -0.918 0.175 -5.260 0.000 -1.260 -0.576 
Percent FRPL -0.470 0.118 -3.970 0.000 -0.701 -0.238 
Percent Black -0.873 0.103 -8.500 0.000 -1.074 -0.672 
Percent Hispanic -0.608 0.111 -5.460 0.000 -0.826 -0.390 
Percent Asian 0.116 0.120 0.970 0.333 -0.119 0.352 
Percent No Certification 1.916 1.890 1.010 0.311 -1.788 5.619 
Percent < 3 Yrs. Exper. -0.189 0.202 -0.940 0.349 -0.585 0.207 
Percent Masters -0.344 0.131 -2.630 0.009 -0.600 -0.087 
Percent Turnover 0.030 0.082 0.370 0.710 -0.130 0.191 
Constant -3.761 1.956 -1.920 0.054 -7.595 0.072 
Number of obs = 591       
Wald chi2(13) = 1567.46      
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000       
Pseudo R2 = 0.1057       
 
 
